Lot 103
GEN. FRANZ HALDER'S INTERROGATION BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
A fine pair of historic documents originating from the personal files of German Gen. FRANZ HALDER (1884-1972), comprising summaries of his interrogation by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey during the occupation of Germany by Allied forces. This initiative was tasked with assessing the effects of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, and later Japan. The interrogation was conducted in two parts, the first presented here as a period mimeographed document, 6pp. 4to., Weisbaden, July 6, 1945, produced by the USSBS and condensing information gained in Halder's interview of June 25, 1945 at a detention center operated by the U.S. 12th Army Group, with interrogators E.F. Denision, G. G. Johnson and Sgt. P. A. Baran. The report summarizes information gleaned from Halder concerning German preparations for war in 1938 and 1939, through the Russian campaign and ending with the Stalingrad campaign in 1942. Although it does not consist of a direct transcript of the questions posed by the interrogators and Halder's answers thereto, his views on the subjects covered are very apparent. In very small part: ‘...Generaloberst von Halder is a professional officer who held high military rank during the world war as well as in the Reichwehr. Since 1938 he served as the Chief of Staff of the Oberkommand des Heeres (OKH)… He was relieved from this post in September 1942. From that time until 21 July 1944 he was arrested by the Gestapo and detained in different jails and concentration camps [under suspicion of involvement in the July 21 assassination plot against Hitler]. He was finally liberated by Allied troops somewhere in Austria or Northern Italy… In the years preceding the outbreak of hostilities against Poland the German Army Command undertook no serious preparations for war. In December 1938 or in January 1939 Hitler issued orders that no army maneuvers should be organized, and no preparations for military action undertaken since war was not to be expected until 1945. Von Halder himself doubted the sincerity of this directive. He felt that it was issued for foreign consumption and was intended to reassure England and Russia… As late as May 1939 war was not regarded as an imminent possibility. At that time von Halder attended a meeting of the heads of all 3 arms of the German Wehrmacht which was presided over by Hitler. In this meeting, Hitler announced: ‘I would be a complete idiot, if I would take the country into a world war because of the lousy Polish conflict'. General von Halder is convinced that both Hitler and Ribbentrop expected Britain and France to accept the fair accompli in Poland and to accede to another Munich. Hitler told him a number of times that it was beyond doubt that England and France were merely bluffing… After the termination of the Polish campaign it was the general understanding in Berlin that the war would soon come to an end. Peace negotiations were conducted through a number of different channels… Von Halder himself was associated with this move and was informed about all the details of the negotiations… Von Halder heard first of the impending operation against Russia by the time the invasion of Britain was fefinitely [sic] called off (November 1940). He does not believe that until that time there were any fears in Berlin that Russia might take the initiative and attack Germany first… Some time in February, March or April (von Halder does not remember the exact date) von Halder reported to Hitler on the plans for the Russian war… Hitler's reaction to this warning was what von Halder terms ‘insulting'. He complained about his generals' lack of courage, asserted that those Russian tanks were all obsolete models… and expressed his conviction that the Russian political regime would collapse as soon as the Germans delivered their first crushing blow. The sources of information of this ‘mysterious man' were a puzzle to von Halder. Hitler always refused to disclose them, hardly ever (once in 3-4 months) consulted his chiefs of staff, and relied upon his own data although they were usually proved to be wrong…' The narrative then discusses the decision to divert the German offensive away from Moscow to destroy Russian forces at Kiev, delaying the drive towards Moscow, continuing: ‘...It is at this point that von Halder feels the acute conflict between the General Staff and Hitler actually began… In July he told von Halder that the Russians had lost 11 million killed, wounded and captured and that at best they may have 2 ½ million left for further conduct of the war. All attempts by von Halder to convince him of the fallaciousness of such estimates remained fruitless. Hitler closed conversations on this and similar topics with remarks that his information bore out his own conclusions…' This portion of the interview concludes: ‘...Up to and including the retreat from Stalingrad it is correct to sum up that neither supplies nor German engagements outside of Russia were responsible for Germany's defeats. The inadequacy of available military manpower was the decisive factor… Von Halder does not know much about the Air Force. He suggested consulting Goering. ‘From him you will get any number of lies you want. Every word of this man is a lie'… Von Halder was relieved of his position on 24 September 1942. The immediate cooperation with Hitler wore him out. He regarded the war as lost.' Halder's interrogation continues in the second mimeographed document presented here, 7pp. 4to., [Weisbaden], July 24, 1945, summarizing the interviews conducted with Halder on June 30 and July 1 by Nicholas Kaldor and K. Mandelbaum. This section of the interview goes into much greater detail regarding Halder's relationship with and opinions towards Hitler, including his leadership in an early plot to remove the Fuhrer from power. In small part: ‘...Von Halder, though a strong anti-Nazi, approved the idea of the rebuilding of the Wehrmacht, for, as he explained, the years following Versailles had shown that without a strong army Germany can not pursue a foreign policy according to her interests… When it became clear to responsible Army circles that Hitler was determined to bring about military intervention on the issue of the Sudeten Germans [in Czechoslovakia], patriots in the German Army decided to prevent what they felt was inevitable catastrophe to Germany by removing Hitler. The leaders of this conspiracy were von Halder himself, [Field Marshal Erwin] von Witzleben, the commander of the Berlin garrison, General [Ludwig] Beck, von Halder's predecessor, [Wolf-Heinrich von] Helldorf, the police president of Berlin, Graf Brockdorff, the head of the Potsdam garrison and [General Carl-Heinrich von] Stupnagel. Von Brauchitsch, he thought, was informed (and thus involved) in the plan, though he himself has never discussed it with him. Outside the leading figures very few people knew about it, although the operation was extremely well planned ant the prospects were extremely favorable… Th plan was to arrest Hitler when in Berlin (though not to kill him. ‘I am strongly opposed to the idea of political murder', said von Halder) and then to lay the full facts before the German people and to say: ‘Here is the man who wants to lead us into war, which, in the opinion of all of us, could only lead the nation into catastrophe.' According to him, the general trend of public opinion in Germany was very favorable to such a move as the idea of war filled everyone with horror, and the feeling about Hitler's genius in the political and diplomatic field only emerged after the Munich agreement… On the day after he [Hitler] returned to Berlin von Halder decided to take action immediately and went to von Witzeleben's office ‘to give the signal' (in his own words). While he was in von Witzleben's office, news was brought to them that Chamberlain was flying to Berchtesgaden next day. This involved the immediate dropping of the plan, since the prospect of war receded and von Halder, who was by no means a rebel by nature, felt that only the extreme necessity of preventing a major catastrophe could have justified him in breaking his oath as a military officer… This extraordinary coincidence between the imminent execution of this operation and Chamberlain's visit ‘may sound extremely theatrical', but, General von Halder assured the interrogators, it was fully in accordance with the facts. If Chamberlain had postponed his visit… Hitler would have been deposed and the subsequent war prevented. ‘But it was God's will, and Gods [sic] ways are inscrutable', added von Halder.' The interview then examines Halder's limited knowledge of and involvement in later plans to remove Hitler, including the July 20 assassination plot, and discusses his subsequent arrest and imprisonment. It then turns to Halder's work on plans to invade Britain and then Russia, which are discussed in great detail, before returning to his deteriorating relationship with Hitler: ‘...With the battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941, von Halder became convinced that Russia could no longer be defeated… On being asked why he did not retireafter [sic] von Brauchitsch's retirement, he told the following story: Hitler told him after von Brauchitsch retired: ‘You, my fine generals, will only play ball so long as everything is favorable. When things get difficult, you simply got ill or chose honorable resignation.' Von Halder's answer was that he could assure the Fuhrer he will never resign or become ill, but instead he will become so unpleasant as Chief of Staff that Hitler will be forced to dismiss him. He thereafter concentrated on being nasty to Hitler, although it took him another six months or so before he succeeded in making Hitler get rid of him. His violent quarrels with Hitler were very frequent throughout this period… Von Halder had a violent hatred of Hitler, to which he frequently gave expression throughout the interrogation. He though the man was a thorough liar, absolutely untrustworthy and completely allergic to reasoning when it was a question of criticizing his pet ideas. He could on occasion sit with a completely motionless face and refuse to listen for hours, and be violently vindictive and extremely bitter on others. His military capabilities were that of a mediocre corporal. His military interventions were disastrous… ‘ Much more good content besides. Each page of both documents bears the warning ‘CONFIDENTIAL' at bottom, and several typed emendations and errors within the text make it clear that they were produced as drafts prior to the final publication of the USSBS report in October of 1945. How Halder came to posses these and other similar documents offered in this sale is unknown. Each document is evenly toned and shows file and staple holes at the left margins, with the title page of each bearing pencil notations, presumably in Halder's hand, and file labels. Both pieces are in very good condition overall.
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