Lot 104
GEN. ADOLF GALLAND'S INTERROGATION BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
A fine pair of historic documents originating from the personal files of German Gen. FRANZ HALDER (1884-1972), comprising summaries of the interrogation of Luftwaffe general and fighter ace ADOLF GALLAND (1912-1996) by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey during the occupation of Germany by Allied forces. This initiative was tasked with assessing the effects of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, and later Japan. The information gleaned from the interrogation of Galand is presented here in two parts, the first a period mimeographed document, 19pp. 4to., [Weisbaden], June 21, 1945, produced by the USSBS and transcribing the second part of Galland's answers to RAF interrogators while he was imprisoned in England immediately after his surrender to Allied forces. This interview covers a wide array of subjects, including the quality of German military aircraft compared to their Allied counterparts, the effectiveness of Allied air attacks against German airfields, specific Luftwaffe tactics deployed in repelling those attacks, Luftwaffe training standards, the relationship between the different branches of the Wehrmacht, and much else. In very small part, covering only a fraction of the most interesting lines of questioning: ‘...Q: Were any disturbances caused through dispersal [of aircraft manufacturing sites]? A: Naturally long delays and big difficulties were caused through dispersal and through bombing. Particularly the finishing of the planes got worse… Q: Why did this construction grow worse? A: Because the assembly lines were interrupted. The planes no longer were in assembly halls, but somewhere the control surfaces were manufactured, in another plant fuselages were made, construction took place in destroyed halls and… in the open air instead of under roofs. Such was the effect of your attacks… Q: Who was responsible for the decision that the [Heinkel] He 177 [a long-range bomber] was to be continued? A: Only Hitler… Q: Did Hitler have any reason for this? A: These were mere expressions of insanity. In the same conference it was also decided that the [Messerschmitt] ‘262', the jet plane, was to be employed as a bomber. This made only more clear it bordered on insanity… Q: Do you know whether Goering agreed with Hitler? A: No. He was not in agreement, but he always gave in after short resistance, and this was very good for him because Hitler was supposed to be very much enraged at that time. Goering neither wanted to have the 177 continued nor did he agree that we could only produce fighters; and, first of all, he never could see any sense to using the ‘262' as a bomber. Goering could never stick to his guns… Q: How was the quality in comparison to the Allied planes? A: In the beginning, we had a slight superiority over the Spitfires. Already in 1843 the front clamoured for improvement… Our fighters always had a very high opinion of the Mustang. They always claimed that, with a few exceptions… the Mustang was superior to the [Messerschmitt] ‘109' and [Focke-Wulf] ‘190'… Q: Speer has said that the plane losses in France were mainly caused on airdromes. Is that correct? A: Yes. At any rate, at the beginning of the invasion [of Normandy]… The second reserve was used up because it was ordered to France senselessly and got into a fleeing retreat. They landed on their airdromes and the following day they had to blow up the engines. That was a completely asinine order by Hitler. I myself tries with Speer to prevent this… Q: How was the relationship between the Luftwaffe, the Army and the Navy? A:… After the Poland and French campaigns nobody wanted to give the Luftwaffe credit, which means that the effect of our absolute superiority in the air was underestimated. The preparations for the invasion of England were under the slogan that the Luftwaffe had to get superiority in the air over England for the Navy. In reality, the Navy was not at all prepared for any large scale invasion. However, the responsibility for the failure to carry out the offensive was charged to the Luftwaffe because allegedly it could not gain air superiority over England. In the Russian campaign the entire Luftwaffe, from the first to the last day, was degraded to the position of an auxiliary arm of the Army and had to help as ‘hook and ladder' in all places where catastrophes occurred… It was concealed, however, that the Luftwaffe had to surrender hundreds of factories in order to satisfy the ground forces and that consequently a steady weakening of our anti-aircraft defenses took place… Q: Can you tell us, successively, the most important targets in order to destroy the German armament production? Which attacks do you consider the most important? A: Oil is the most important, railways come next… Third come the planes… Q: Were the losses of the Luftwaffe worse through the bombing of the plants than through the losses in aerial combat? A: Yes… Q: How would it have been possible for us, in your opinion, to take better advantage of our air force with regard to the choice of objectives? A: First of all, if you had not attacked aviation plants, but engine plants. Next point: if in addition to the engine plants, you had attacked the hydrogenation plants. Then, thirdly, if you had attacked the transportation system earlier than the industry in which case you would have brought the industry to a standstill… ‘ The second document presented here, 8pp. 4to., [Weisbaden], Aug. 10, 1945, condenses information presented in both the interview transcribed above and an earlier such transcript (absent here) into a series of data points for easy incorporation into the final report of the USSBS, which was released in October of 1945. Much more good content besides. Each page of both documents bears the warning ‘CONFIDENTIAL' at bottom. How Halder came to posses these and other similar documents offered in this sale is unknown. Each document is evenly toned and shows file and staple holes at the left margins, with the title page of each bearing pencil notations, presumably in Halder's hand, and file labels. Both pieces are in very good condition overall.
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