Description:

GEN. ALFRED JODL'S INTERROGATION BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
A fine historic document originating from the personal files of German Gen. FRANZ HALDER (1884-1972), comprising a transcript the interrogation of General ALFRED JODL (1890-1946), Chief of the Operations Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey during the occupation of Germany by Allied forces. This initiative was tasked with assessing the effects of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, and later Japan. The information gleaned from the interrogation of Jodl is presented here as a period mimeographed document, 6pp. 4to., [Weisbaden], June 7, 1945, produced by the USSBS and transcribing Jodl's answers to interrogators when interviewed on May 19, 1945, days prior to his arrest along with the rest of the Flensburg Government on June 23 and subsequent imprisonment at Camp Ashcan. The interview in particular focuses on Jodl's view of the air war against Germany, in which he squarely attributes the greater number and quality of both fighters and bombers to the Allied success in overwhelming German air defenses. In very small part: ‘Q: 1- I am particularly interested in the effects of the air war on strategic targets. A: Do you mean from the historical point of view, or that of general interest? Q: From the point of view of histerical [sic] interest… I would like a comprehensive picture of the effects of our air war on your strategic plans and considerations. A: We realized fully at the beginning of the war, that there was hardly any country which was as vulnerable to air attacks as Germany. The reasons are clear. They were (1) comparatively small land area, (2) density of population, (3) large number of cities and transport lines, and (4) vulnerability of the entire area to enemy bomber fleets. We recognized quite early that if an air force has achieved complete air superiority, the land fighting generally becomes hopeless. We made those experiences ourselves through the success of our own air war in the Polish and in the French campaigns… Q: 4- I understand that it must have been your object to keep our losses as high as possible to break the backbone of our attacks. I would be very glad if you could give me a few indications why it was not possible to carry out this vital aim. A: In general it can be said: We did not recognize or did not succeed in time to build a fighter, which would have been able with its radius, speed and armament to effectively fight the high fire power of the bombers at such great altitudes… Q: 5- The air superiority showed up at Alamein to a larger extent, but we still had by no means the control of the air. A: You then produced a fighter which was superior to our Me 109, which meant that our fighters were no longer sufficient for further action, and had to be replaced with new, and considerably improved types…' The interviewer then asks a series of questions intended to gauge the impact of specific bombing raids on German morale and strategy, to which Jodl replies: ‘A: You keep on asking, whether the effect of the air attacks influenced our strategy, I can only say to this: The effects of the air war became quite obvious and clear to everybody from this moment on, and there could be no doubt about, it [sic], that the effects would constantly increase an ever-growing scale.. It was clear, that we could no longer undertake any large-scale offensives…' Much more good content besides. Each page of the document bears the warning ‘CONFIDENTIAL' at bottom, and several typed and handwritten emendations and errors within the text make it clear that it was produced as a draft prior to the final publication of the USSBS report in October of 1945. How Halder came to posses this and other similar documents offered in this sale is unknown. The document is evenly toned and shows filed and staple holes at the left margins, with the title page bearing a pencil notation, presumably in Halder's hand, and file labels. In very good condition overall.

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April 21, 2026 10:00 AM EDT
Elkton, MD, US

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$0 $99 $10
$100 $499 $20
$500 $999 $50
$1,000 $1,999 $100
$2,000 $4,999 $250
$5,000 $9,999 $500
$10,000 $19,999 $1,000
$20,000 $49,999 $2,500
$50,000 $99,999 $5,000
$100,000 $999,999 $10,000
$1,000,000 $1,999,999 $50,000
$2,000,000 + $100,000