Lot 50
O.K.H. 'KRIEGSTAGEBUCH' WAR DIARY ENTRIES ON OPERATION ‘WINTERSPORT', (II)
Historically important, unique set of O.K.H. war diaries, entries from the 'Kriegstagebuch' being official daily OKH war records for nearly 1.5 million men on the southern front used during planning for the German 'Operation Wintersport', the unrealized German plan in late 1941-1942 for capturing Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus, later attempted as Operation Edelweiss. The pencil notes, 2pp. 16.5 x 11.5 in., [n.p.], late November, 1941, are written in an unknown hand but original and from the estate of German Gen. FRANZ HALDER (1884-1972) who planned 'Operation Barbarossa', the invasion of the Soviet Union. The notes, marked 'KTB', indicate they are from the war diary of the German Army groups mentioned. These KTB / KTB Anlage kept a log of the daily actions/operations at the German High Command. Halder obviously stole these at some point as these were used as in the last arguments he had with Hitler concerning the operation. Case Blue/Wintersport would not work, and Halder was correct. The 6th Army entered Stalingrad, Moscow drive was lost and the oil fields were too far for the reach. The review and analysis of the situation reads, in small part: ‘November 13th. Commander of the 1st Panzer Army reports that, due to severe frost, movements can resume. The Panzer Army High Command intends to initially regroup, as the enemy has had time to establish a defense against the announced advance from the north towards Rostov along the Taslov sector, and therefore the possibility of surprise has been lost there. The focus will now be shifted more to the left (northern) flank of the 3rd Panzer Army, with masses of the Panzer Army being concentrated to first break through eastward along Taslov and then turn south. Simultaneously, a deception attack by the 16th Panzer Army will proceed southward eastward towards Budyenny. The attack is expected the day after tomorrow. November 14th. Result of the commanders' meeting in Orska, Annex 60. November 15th. November 17th. Message to Army High Command, Operational Department: a) So far, efforts to persuade the Italian expeditionary command to launch a further attack eastward following the advance of the IV Army Corps have not been successful. b) Due to insufficient troop arrivals, the 6th Army is facing a new supply crisis, which prevents it from advancing towards Kupyansk without exposing its troops there to the risk of disaster. The 6th Army is also unwilling to redeploy forces to the northern wing, as supply difficulties there are even greater than on the southern wing. Army Group South Operation >Winter Sports< Appendix 71: After completion of the operation in Crimea and against Rostov, after the commissioning of the railway line to the 1st Panzer Army and 11th Army, after a refitting period of 4 to 6 weeks for rapid units and infantry divisions, after the construction of a supply railway in Crimea and in the Taganrog/Rostov area, and after the arrival of reinforcements for the 1st Panzer Army (infantry and light divisions) in the Shakhty area, Army Group South intends to conduct the operation against Maikop in 3 phases. Phase One: Crossing at Kerch. Planned timeframe: 5-10 days. Establishment of bridgeheads across the Don. Phase Two: Advance into the area east of Kerch and the rapid units to the Timoshevskaya – Tishoretsk – Salsk line. Simultaneously, deploying infantry divisions against this line. Third section: Continuation of the advance from the area east of Kerch and the rapid units towards Maikop and Petroskoye. Equation of forces: 11th Army – one General Command + 3 infantry divisions, possibly 1-2 additional infantry divisions 1st Panzer Army – five General Commands, 7 rapid units, 7 infantry divisions, mountain and light divisions 1st Panzer Army November 13: III. Enemy artillery harassment fire XVI. Reconnaissance to Tuslov – Pugachev captured XXXXIX. Army Corps reconnaissance to Darievka November 14: Regrouping for assault on Rostov. November 15: Regrouping for continued assault on Rostov completed. November 17 After a successful breakthrough through defensive positions south of Tuslov, Bolskije Ssala was captured. The enemy, in turn, attacked the XIV and XXXXIX Army Corps against the 1st Panzer Army in the east and was repulsed. The third breakthrough, with a combined Panzer wedge (13th Panzer Regiment, 14th Panzer Army, and SS Division Adolf Hitler), occurred south of Tuslov in the extension of Kolmykaja. After reaching the area south of Nessvetai, the corps turned south and captured Bolskije Ssala in the subsequent advance. Partial forces captured Generalskij Most and Kostantinoskoj in the north. The XIV Army Corps, on the right flank, attacked the enemy position north of Kamenyj Bord – otherwise, it defended against enemy attacks. XXXXIX Army Corps: Defense November 18 The pace of the attacks was hampered by fog. The overall impression was that the enemy, with all available forces in the industrial area and west of the Donets River, intended to maintain a bridgehead and delay the advance into the Voroshlovgorod area as much as possible. Through several attacks, some with stronger forces, against the Southern, Eastern, and Northeastern Fronts of the 1st Panzer Army, as well as through increased resistance in front of the offensive wing of the 17th Army, the enemy attempted to influence the advance on Rostov. III. Repulsion of strong enemy attacks, supported by numerous artillery pieces and with over 100 tanks, from the east, southeast, south, and southwest against Bolskye Sala. With the right wing, the area reached 6 kilometers southeast of Malyje Sala, with the left wing south towards Budjennyj. ' Very good. Excellent, in depth detail on a little-studied abortive German operation. Accompanied by a second, similar document, 2pp. 16.5 x 11.5 in., [n.p.], late November, 1941, in small part: ‘November 30th. The enemy continued his offensive against the southern wing of the 1st Panzer Army with ruthless use of manpower and materiel. Against the front, which had been withdrawn as planned behind the Kolmytskaya sector, he brought up strong forces in a sharp pursuit and began massed attacks in the morning hours, focusing on the flank of the III Panzer Corps. The fact that the enemy attacks could again only be repelled by the deployment of the last reserves and at the mouth of the Mokr. The local breakthrough in Tschaltyo, as well as the realization that, in anticipation of the continuation of the enemy attack, a new, decisive resolution of the situation through the formation of sufficient reserves was necessary, prompted Army Group High Command and Panzer Army High Command 1 independently to consider withdrawing the southern wing of the 1st Panzer Army to the prepared position of the Ssambek-Mchuz-Mius sector. In full agreement with the assessment of the situation, Army Group High Command, on the afternoon of November 30th, considered the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of Panzer Army, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group, to order the withdrawal of the southern wing of the 1st Panzer Army to the Ssambek-Mchuz-Mius position and to initiate the corresponding measures immediately. This decision was reported to the Army High Command, General Staff Operations Department. Subsequent consultations between the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the Operations Department with the Commander of Army Group revealed that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group, while supported by the Army General Staff, had not received the approval of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Apparently due to intervention by the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Army High Command ordered the 1st Panzer Army to withdraw, for the time being, only to the Merchsnowskij line – the right flank of the current position of the SS Division Wiking – which was to be held initially. Following further consultation with Panzer Army High Command 1, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group reported the feasibility of this order and requested the rescission of the order issued by the Army High Command. The decision of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group is based on the situation assessment conducted at 2:00 PM: The continued determination of the enemy's leadership and fighting spirit, the constant reduction of our own combat strength, and the impossibility of temporarily escaping enemy pressure by withdrawing the southern wing of the 1st Panzer Army behind the Kolmytskaya sector, could cause the latent tactical crisis on the southern wing of the 1st Panzer Army, which has been ongoing for days, to become an operational one if the enemy succeeds in breaking through into the Taganrog area. Operational reserves would not be available in a timely manner in such a case. The possibility of large-scale enemy attacks on the northern wing of the 1st Panzer Army remains. The intended attack of the 4th Army to the southeast, given its weakness, cannot have a decisive impact on the overall situation on the Eastern Front. The danger of an enemy breakthrough towards Mariupol and into the area south of Stalino necessitates, if the overall situation is to be fundamentally rectified, a withdrawal of the 1st Panzer Army and the eastern wing of the 17th Army to a line where it is possible to organize a decisive defense without enemy pressure and which allows for the creation of at least sufficient tactical reserves by shortening the front. Consideration should be given to withdrawing the 1st Panzer Army behind the Mchus and Krynky rivers to the general Taganrog-Zorlovka line and the eastern wing of the 17th Army behind the Bakhmut sector. The Chief of the Panzer Army High Command requests that the withdrawal of the 17th Army be refrained from and that the intended attack IV be carried out, because otherwise there is a risk of gaining full freedom of action against the northern wing of the 1st Panzer Army and the Italian Ex. Company. The request of the Chief of the Panzer Army High Command is granted, the withdrawal of the 1st Panzer Army to the prepared Mchus-Mius position is approved, and the intention to establish the decision to link the 17th Army to the northern wing of the XXXXIX Army Corps through attack IV on December 3rd is maintained. 2:50 PM Department Ia Army Group Major in Group Philippi (Operational Department) regarding the decision and intention of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group 1st Panzer Army XIV. Commencement of the withdrawal of the right wing in conjunction with III. Panzer Corps XXXXIX. Defense against enemy reconnaissance advances Report on the personnel and equipment condition of the 1st Panzer Army: Due to the heavy, continuous fighting of the last 12 days, constant air attacks, harsh winter weather to which the troops are exposed without protection, insomnia, and the recurring enemy masses, the troops are under extreme physical and mental strain. Motor vehicles are severely lacking; the number of operational tanks is between 16 and 25 per division…' Accompanied by eight additional pages of handwritten notes on legal folio sheets, describing related troop concentrations, tactical maneuvers, etc. No official war diaries higher than regimental level have ever been offered on the market. These are for the entire Battle Group South, including the 6th Army!
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