Description:

GEN. WOLFGANG THOMALE'S INTERROGATION ON PANZER FORCES BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
A fine historic document originating from the personal files of German Gen. FRANZ HALDER (1884-1972), comprising a transcript the interrogation of Lt. General WOLFGANG THOMALE (1900-1978), Chief of Staff to Inspector General of the Armored Troops Heinz Guderian, by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey during the occupation of Germany by Allied forces. This initiative was tasked with assessing the effects of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, and later Japan. The information gleaned from the interrogation of Thomale is presented here as a period mimeographed document, 11pp. 4to., [Weisbaden], June 9, 1945, produced by the USSBS and transcribing Thomale's answers to Allied interrogators when interviewed on May 20, 1945. The USSBS's lines of questioning primarily focus on the organization of Germany's panzer divisions and the effectiveness of the Allied air campaign in curtailing production of new tanks, primarily the Tiger, to replace battlefield losses. In very small part, ‘… [Q] How many armored divisions did the army have? [A] Army: 34 Armored divisions, including the armored corps ‘Grossdeutschland', ‘Feldherrnhalle' and ‘Hermann Goring'. Waffen SS: 7 Armored divisions. Airforce: 2 Armored divisions. Total: 43 Armored divisions… Under the armored divisions came the newly organized armored divisions ‘Muncheberg', ‘Clausewitz', ‘Kurmark', ‘Norwegen' and 233, armored divisions, which are in quality and quantity considerably worse than the other and older armored divisions. [Q] Under whom came the Tiger Divisions? [A] The Tiger Divisions were independent parts of the Army, which in certain cases were placed under certain armies, which stood in the center of the heaviest fighting. They fought mostly as the ‘striking weapon' (Schwerpunktwaffe) with the armored divisions… [Q] What was the break-down of the Tiger Divisions? [A] The Tiger Divisions were broken down into staff and three companies, altogethe [sic] 45 Tigers, since fall 1944 they had only 31 Tigers. [Q] What was the reason for the drop from 45 to 31 Tigers? [A] There were two reasons: 1. The number of Tiger divisions was increased. 2. The planned production of Tigers dropped on account of the air raids. There was only one firm for the manufacture of Tigers, namely, Hentschel at Kassel. A further reason for the drop in Tiger production were the air attacks on transportation facilities and factories making certain parts for Tigers… [Q] Was the Tiger slower than the other armored vehicles? [A] Yes, the Tiger had the same motor as the Panther, was however considerably heavier and therefore slower. [Q] When did it become clear that the armored troops would lose their fighting value, due to the strategic bombing of the American and English Air Forces? [A] …About the time of the air attack on the Opel Works at Brandenburg, which out thi [sic] firm out of action around April 1944, began the crippling effects on the armored troops… Next came the shortage of fuel. The armored production was the last to be effected [sic]… [Q] Was it possible, during the last quarter of 1944, to bring armored divisions up to full strength in the east and west? [A] No, only those divisions which were destined for an offensive, could fill their strenght [sic] up to nearly normal on personnel and material. Due to the air attacks, we had to reduce the 44th by 170 tanks, and the 45 armored divisions by 75 tanks, at the beginning of 1945… [Q] At which time did you notice the difficulties in the maneuverability and operations possibilities of the armored troops? [A] Beginning in the fall of 1944, the Armored-Grenadiere had to be partly moved by bicycles, due to the shortage of heavy vehicles and fuel. Later, they could only be moved by foot. Only the heavy weapons were continuously moved by motor. [Q] Did the shortage of heavy vehicles and fuel have a considerable effect on the operational possibilities of the armored troops since the fall of 1944? [A] Yes, at times the armored divisions had only the maneuverability of infantry divisions. The offensive in the Ardennes cost us many heavy vehicles due to the air raids on the narrow, crowded streets of the Eifel… [Q] Did the daylight attacks of American planes (fighters) have a noticeable effect on the maneuverability of the armored units on the battle-field and did they lead to a change in strategies? [A] We tried to achieve a protection from the air, by using AAA 8 flak guns on number III and number IV vehicles in the armored regiments. There were also air defense weapons (2 cm Vierling or 3.7 cm Einling) either horse drawn or mounted on trucks…. [Q] Did you consider the fact, at the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, that there was no large supply of fuel…? [A] We hoped that our troops would capture English and American fuel supplies. [Q] What were the reasons for the collapse of the east and west fronts? [A] We have to accredit the collapse mainly to the failure of the air force. It is impossible for a land army to fight against land as well as air opposition at the same time. [Q] Did the air force no longer exist or was it insufficient? [A] There was no more air force…' Much more good content besides. Each page of the document bears the warning ‘CONFIDENTIAL' at bottom, and several errors within the text make it clear that it was produced as a draft prior to the final publication of the USSBS report in October of 1945. How Halder came to posses this and other similar documents offered in this sale is unknown. The document is evenly toned and shows filed and staple holes at the left margins, with the title page bearing several pencil notations, presumably in Halder's hand, including, oddly, Thomale's name being struck through and replaced with that of Luftwaffe Field Marshal Hugo von Sperrle, itself then struck through. In very good condition overall.

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April 21, 2026 10:00 AM EDT
Elkton, MD, US

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