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Lot 106
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FIELD MARSHAL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT’S INTERROGATION BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
FIELD MARSHAL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT’S INTERROGATION BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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Description:

FIELD MARSHAL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT'S INTERROGATION BY THE U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
A fine historic document originating from the personal files of German Gen. FRANZ HALDER (1884-1972), summarizing the interrogation of Wehrmacht Field Marshal GERD VON RUNDSTEDT (1875-1953), commander-in-chief of German forces on the Western Front, by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey during the occupation of Germany by Allied forces. This initiative was tasked with assessing the effects of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, and later Japan. The information gleaned from Rundstedt is presented here as a period mimeographed document, 7pp. 4to., [Weisbaden], July 6, 1945, produced by the USSBS and comprising a summary of his interview on June 25 with interrogators E.F. Denision, G. G. Johnson and Sgt. P. A. Baran. The report summarizes information gleaned from Rundstedt concerning the German offensive in Poland, the Battle of France, through the Russian campaign and ending with the Stalingrad campaign in 1942. Although it does not consist of a direct transcript of the questions posed by the interrogators and Rundstedt's answers thereto, his views on the subjects covered are very apparent. The document opens with a summary of Rundstedt's career and lays out the objectives of the interview, and continues, in very small part: ‘...Rundstedt asserted that neither he nor the generals who he intimately knew were aware of plans to attack Poland until Summer 1939. To the extent to which a war against Poland was anticipated, it was believed the Poland might attack Germany first… Rundstedt remarked that even Germany's peacetime Reichswehr would have been able to deal with the situation very adequately. He protested, however, against the propaganda version that the war against Poland was concluded in 18 days. 14 more days of hard fighting were actually required. Before the outbreak of hostilities with Poland, a war against Russia was not anticipated in the Circles of Field Marshall von Rundstedt. Contrariwise, he believed that relations with Russia were settled by non-agression pact and regarded this settlement as eminently satisfactory and wise…. Quick success in the French campaign was expected by Field Marshall von Rundstedt. The reasons for optimism were numerous: a) The failure of the Allies to attack in the autumn or winter of 1939/40 was interpreted as a sign of weakness. b) The removal of General Gamelin from the leadership of the French Armies deprived the Allies of one of their ablest commanders. c) Available intelligence indicated that the equipment of the French Army was inadequate and obsolete. d) The French troops were regarded as ‘green' while tge German Army included sizeable [sic] elements of veterans from the Polish campaign. The German Command also gained valuable experience in coordinating different arms of the service in the conduct of operations in the East… After the French campaign was terminated Rundstedt believed that the war was ended… The German Airforce attack on Britain was intended to shatter Britain's will to continue the war, and to destroy economic assets.. The air attack was suspended according to Rundstedt because it became obvious that the British continued in their ‘stubborness' [sic] and that further expenditure of effort was not promising. He did not think that attacks were stopped because the losses were too heavy… Rundstedt was very critical of the German strategy in Russia in 1941. Consistently with his original judgement [sic], he would have ordered a retreat to the Dneipr where he would have settled down for the winter. His main purpose would have been to replenish his reserves, to organize supplies, and to provide his troops with rest… Hitler, however, did not share Rundstedt's views on the campaign. He insisted on a rapid advance toward the Caucasus and ordered the occupation of Rostov-Don… The differences of Hitler in Rundstedt over strategy on the Southern Front in Russia reached such a degree of intensity in September that Rundstedt was relieved… In March 1942 Field Marshall von Rundstedt was appointed Supreme Commander in Chief of the German Forces on the Western Front. He pictures his situation there as altogether satisfactory. The troops were well equipped and well supplied. The transport conditions were in perfect order. The organization Todt, entrusted with the construction of fortifications, functioned well… Much less satisfactory than the ground forces was the functioning of the GAF [Luftwaffe]. Asked for reasons of this deficiency Rundstedt remarked that he was not familiar with the problems of the GAF. He ventured the suggestions, however, that heavy losses on the Eastern Front… and the large consumption of oil in the African and Italian campaign… were responsible for the decline of the GAF… On 1 July 1944 von Rundstedt claims to have ‘resigned' and left military service. After this information was obtained the following conversation developed: Question: ‘Why did you resign at this point of the campaign?' Answer: ‘For reasons of health.' Question: ‘This was the official explanation. Why did you actually resign?' Answer: ‘I do not know.'… When Rundstedt returned to his post in September, he found conditions in the theatre to be catastrophic… It was Rundstedt's conviction that after Germany's defeat at Stalingrad a victory over Russia became impossible… The principal cause of Germany's defeat Rundstedt sees in shortage of military manpower. Even if the enemy would have exceeded Germany's military potential in no other respects, the manpower relation was such that Germany was bound to lose the war… In spite of his conviction that the war was lost as early as winter 1942/43… Rundstedt refrained from suggesting peace negotiations. He does not believe that a general who would have suggested capitulation would have been shot in years preceding the attempt on Hitler's life in 1944. Nevertheless no one dared to voice such suggestions… The attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944 was a mistake according to Rundstedt. Even if successful it would not have eased Germany's fate or have induced the Allies to offer Germany better terms of peace. At this time the Allies were determined to reap all fruits of their victory.' Much more good content besides. Each page of the document bears the warning ‘CONFIDENTIAL' at top and bottom, and several errors within the text make it clear that it was produced as drafts prior to the final publication of the USSBS report in October of 1945. How Halder came to posses these and other similar documents offered in this sale is unknown. The document is evenly toned and shows file and staple holes at the left margins, with the title page bearing pencil notations, presumably in Halder's hand, and a file label. In very good condition overall.

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April 21, 2026 10:00 AM EDT
Elkton, MD, US

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